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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines whether public equity firms and private equity firms with public debt exhibit 
different degrees of real earnings management, defined as the manipulation of operational 
activities in order to influence reported earnings. Public equity firms face intense capital market 
scrutiny that their private equity counterparts do not. Therefore, this study’s comparison of the 
two types of firms provides insight on the impact of capital market pressure on real earnings 
management behaviors. My results show that public equity firms are more likely than private 
equity firms to opportunistically alter normal operations to improve earnings by pushing sales 
through discounts and promotions, and by lowering costs of sales through overproduction. I find 
no difference in abnormal discretionary expenses between public equity and private equity firms. 
Although private equity firms with public debt do not face the same capital market pressure that 
public equity firms face, they are not immune from incentives to engage in real earnings 
management. Specifically, I find that private equity firms with public debt engage in real earnings 
management as their debt moves closer to default. Moreover, private equity firms with public debt 
that do engage in real earnings management appear to emphasize the zero earnings benchmark, 
consistent with prior research, suggesting that this benchmark is of primary importance to 
creditors.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
n a widely cited survey of corporate CFOs by Graham et al. (2005), more than two-thirds of 
respondents said they would decrease spending on research and development, advertising and 
maintenance and one-third of respondents indicated that they would postpone investment in positive net 
present value projects in order to meet short-term earnings goals. This startling evidence raises the question of 
whether the stock market’s excessive focus on near-term earnings performance leads managers to make operational 
decisions in the short run at the expense of long-term performance — a concern that has been echoed by influential 
business leaders
1
 In this paper, I provide empirical evidence directly related to this question by comparing the 
tendency of public equity firms and a matched sample of private equity firms with public debt 
2
  to meet earnings 
benchmarks through real earnings management, defined as the manipulation of operational activities to influence 
reported earnings. Prior research documents that firms engage in real earnings management to achieve various 
earnings targets (Baber et al. 1991; Bartov 1993; Roychowdhury 2006; Zang 2012; Chen 2009; Demers and Wang 
2010). Under Sections 13 and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, both public equity firms and private 
equity firms with publicly traded debt are subject to the same financial reporting requirements and regulations. The 
                                                 
1 For example, John Bogle (of Vanguard), Warren Buffett (of Berkshire Hathaway) and Lou Gerstner (ex-CEO, IBM) were signatories to the 
Aspen Institute’s call for an end to excessive short-termism in American business as set forth in Overcoming Short-termism: A Call for a More 
Responsible Approach to Investment and Business Management, Aspen Institute dated September 9, 2009. 
2 In this paper, I interchangeably use the terms private equity with public debt firms, private firms, and public debt firms. These terms mean that 
the firm has private equity, but has publicly traded debt. I also interchangeably use public firms, public equity ownership, and publicly held firms. 
They mean that firms trade equity publicly in stock exchanges. These firms may or may not have publicly traded debt. 
I 
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availability of financial accounting data for public equity and private equity firms (with public debt) under SEC 
reporting requirements allows me to test whether the greater capital market pressure faced by public equity firms 
contributes to this practice.  
 
The pressure associated with public stock markets is due to the fact that stock prices respond quickly to the 
release of new information such as earnings. An extensive stream of research shows that the capital market penalizes 
those firms with earnings that fail to meet important thresholds including: profits, growth and analyst forecasts 
(Penno and Simon 1986; Stein 1989; Beatty et al. 2002; Bartov, Givoly and Hayn 2002; Brown and Caylor 2005; 
Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Fischer and Stocken 2004; Givoly et al. 2010). Because stock prices are often a direct 
input into managers’ evaluations and compensation managers of public firms are concerned with how stock markets 
react to earnings releases and, therefore, face pressure to meet these benchmarks (Cheng and Warfield 2005).  
 
The impact of capital market pressure is not clear ex ante. On the one hand, the scrutiny associated with the 
public equity markets may play a disciplining role that leads firms to refrain from activities that distort reported 
earnings. Under this view, external investors demand high quality financial reporting to diligently monitor and 
discipline managers and managers of public firms respond to this demand by providing earnings reports that are 
more reflective of true financial outcomes than those of their private counterparts. Consistent with this perspective, 
Burgstahler et al. (2006) conclude that the capital market evaluates a firm’s overall reporting environment and 
improves earnings informativeness. On the other hand, public ownership of equity may increase managers’ reporting 
incentives to satisfy market expectations due to the penalties faced by public equity firms that fail to meet earnings 
benchmarks (e.g. Penno and Simon 1986; Stein 1989; Beatty et al. 2002; Bartov, Givoly and Hayn 2002; Brown and 
Caylor 2005; Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Fischer and Stocken 2004; Givoly et al. 2010). This additional pressure 
may lead to greater manipulation of reported earnings.  
 
My sample consists of 5,414 firm-years related to 882 private equity firms with public debt and 42,389 
firm-years related to 5,805 public equity firms from 1987 through 2009. I focus on the following forms of real 
earnings management identified by Roychowdhury (2006): (1) the acceleration of sales through aggressive sales 
through aggressive sales discounts or lenient credit terms, (2) the lowering of the cost of goods sold by 
overproducing to spread fixed production costs over more units, and (3) the reduction of discretionary expenses such 
as selling, general and administrative expenses and advertising expenses. I find that the public equity firms are more 
likely than private equity firms to opportunistically alter normal operations to meet earnings benchmarks by pushing 
sales through discounts and promotions, and by lowering costs of sales through overproduction. I find no difference 
in abnormal discretionary expenses between public equity and private equity firms. These results are robust to the 
inclusion of controls for various determinants of real earnings management as well as to various procedures 
designed to correct for the endogenous nature of the firm’s status as a public or private firm including: the Heckman 
two-stage correction and propensity score matching techniques. Collectively, the results suggest that exposure to the 
public equity markets is associated with a greater tendency to meet earnings benchmarks through the alteration of 
operational activities. 
 
Although private equity firms exhibit less real earnings management than public equity firms in response to 
potentially missing earnings benchmarks, they are not free from incentives to manage earnings (Coppens and Peek 
2005). Specifically, Jiang (2008) shows that the zero earnings benchmark is particularly relevant for debt investors 
and that firms that fail to meet this earnings benchmark are punished in the form of higher cost of debt capital. 
Therefore, I examine whether private equity firms engage in a greater degree of earnings management in response to 
the zero earnings benchmark versus the zero earnings growth benchmark. I find that private equity firms with public 
debt engage in real earnings management to a greater degree in response to the zero earnings benchmark, consistent 
with prior research suggesting that this benchmark is of primary importance to creditors. In addition, prior research 
demonstrates that the payoffs to debt claims behave more like equity and that earnings become more relevant to 
debtholders as the debt moves closer to default (Coppens and Peek 2005; Easton et al. 2009). Hence, public debt 
investors in private equity firms with speculative debt may exert similar pressure to that exerted by public equity 
investors. To test this possibility, I examine whether private equity firms with public debt engage in real earnings 
management to meet earnings benchmarks to a greater degree when the debt is speculative. I find that private equity 
firms with public debt engage in a greater degree of real earnings management as their debt moves closer to default, 
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consistent with the notion that public debtholders exert similar pressure to public equity holders when debt claims 
become more equity-like. 
 
This study makes a number of contributions. First, it provides evidence directly related to the question of 
whether the stock market’s focus on short-term earnings performance affects a firm’s operational decisions. Second, 
following Givoly et al. (2010) I examine the role of ownership structure on reported earnings in a unique setting 
where both public and private equity firms face similar reporting requirements but different market pressure. Third, I 
provide evidence on the circumstances under which private equity firms (with public debt) face earnings 
management incentives even in the absence of the pressure exerted by public equity markets. Specifically, my 
evidence that private equity firms engage in more real earnings management to meet benchmarks as their debt 
approaches default suggests that the public equity markets are not the only source of pressure for firms to meet 
earnings benchmarks. Finally, I demonstrate that real earnings management behavior in response to earnings 
benchmarks differs based on the importance of the benchmarks. Specifically, I find that private equity firms are 
more responsive to the zero earnings benchmark than are public equity firms, consistent with prior evidence that the 
zero earnings benchmark is most relevant for creditors. My evidence that public equity firms appear to alter 
operations more extensively in response to earnings benchmarks than do private firms provides an interesting 
perspective on the stock market. While the primary role of capital markets is to efficiently allocate capital through 
prices, my findings raise the possibility that public equity markets may distort operational decisions to the extent 
managers consider factors other than net present value as they make these decisions.  
 
I discuss the motivation of my study and develop testable hypotheses in the Introduction section. Data and 
sample selection procedure and research design are discussed in next section, followed by descriptive statistics and 
the results of the empirical tests. Finally, I present a summary and conclusions of the paper. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Earnings are a highly scrutinized measure of firm performance, and is a common input in the managers’ 
performance evaluations. The literature finds that earnings benchmarks serve as convenient focal points for investors 
in assessing firm performance (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge et al. 1999; Fischer and Stocken 2004). 
Consistent with this notion, a substantial body of research firms has documented discontinuities in the distribution of 
reported earnings around key earnings benchmarks, with an abnormally high frequency of reported earnings just 
above versus just below the earnings benchmark of interest (Degeorge et al. 1999; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997).  
 
One stream of research argue that private firms face less capital market pressure than firms with publicly 
traded equity because their stocks are not publicly traded and executive compensation is not tied to stock price 
performance (Beatty et al., 2002; Givoly et al., 2010). Unlike to private firms, managers of public firms have 
incentives to avoid the penalties associated with missing earnings benchmarks because a firm’s stock price 
performance has important compensation and career consequences for the manager. Specifically, executives’ cash 
and bonus payments are dependent upon firm performance (Gaver et al. 1995). In addition, as the equity market has 
expanded, a significant portion of executive compensation has become equity-based (Babchuk and Grinstein 2005). 
Also, because private firms are on average smaller, less diversified, and have lower analyst following, their financial 
statements are the main source of information for outsiders (Beatty et al. 2002). As a result, private firms may have 
greater incentives to produce more informative financial statements and, therefore, may engage in less real earnings 
management to meet earnings targets.   
 
The other stream of research shows that public equity ownership requires more transparency and higher 
reporting quality since the market monitors the corporation more actively (i,e., Burgstahler et al., 2006). If private 
firms face fewer constraints on their behavior because they do not face the active monitoring of the capital market, 
then they may engage in more earnings management to meet earnings targets. Consistent with this possibility, Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005) and Burgstahler et al. (2006) find that private equity firms produce less conservative and 
lower quality earnings reports in an absence of market demand for high quality financial statements and reduced 
regulatory requirements. Based on the arguments so far, I propose the following null hypothesis: 
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H1:  Public equity firms and private equity firms do not differ in the extent of real operating activities 
manipulation to meet earnings benchmarks.  
 
Although private firms do not face capital market pressure from the public equity markets, they are not 
necessarily free of incentives to meet earnings benchmarks. Prior research shows that, as in the equity market, bond 
markets respond to earnings news (Coppens and Peek 2005; Plummer and Tse 1999) and reward firms for meeting 
earnings benchmarks in the form of lower cost of debt capital (Jiang 2008). Therefore, private firms have incentives 
to report earnings that meet or exceed earnings targets in order to satisfy bond markets and minimize the cost of debt 
capital. Consistent with this notion, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find that firms near a debt covenant violation 
tend to inflate earnings. Therefore, I expect that the difference between public equity firms and private equity firms 
with public debt in their use of real earnings management to meet earnings targets to decline as the public debt of the 
private equity firms moves closer to default. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis, stated in the alternative 
form.  
 
H2a:  The difference between public and private firms in the propensity to engage in real earnings management to 
meet or beat the earnings benchmarks declines as the private firms’ publicly traded debt approaches 
default. 
 
 The pressure to meet earnings targets to satisfy the bond market likely differs from the pressure to meet 
earnings targets in the equity market due to differences in the relevance of earnings in the two markets as a results of 
differences in the payoff functions of debt and equity (Coppens and Peek 2005; Jiang 2008; Easton et al. 2009). 
Specifically, shareholders focus on upside opportunities since their downside risks are limited to their investments, 
while their wealth for the upside potential is unlimited. By contrast bondholders, as fixed claimants, are less 
interested in upside potential and are mainly concerned whether the firm will survive and satisfy its financial 
obligations. Therefore, in contrast to its impact on shareholders, earnings are more relevant to bondholders as a 
firm’s financial condition weakens. Consistent with this notion, Plummer and Tse (1999) find that earnings are more 
informative to bondholders as bond ratings decline and as firms report losses, Similarly, Easton et al. (2009) find 
that the earnings are more informative for bondholders when the earnings news is negative for firms with 
speculative-grade bonds. Jiang (2008) shows that, among the various earnings benchmarks, bondholders are more 
interested in the firm’s ability to report positive income than in its ability to beat prior year income. Collectively, 
these studies suggest that private equity firms with public debt are more likely to tailor any earnings management 
activities they engage in around the profit benchmark than around the earnings growth benchmark. This argument 
leads to the following hypothesis, stated in the alternative form.   
 
H2b:  Private equity firms with public debt are more likely to engage in real earnings management to beat the 
profit benchmark than to beat the earnings growth  benchmark. 
 
THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
Data And Sample Selection 
 
My sample of firms is taken from Compustat for the years 1987-2009.
3
 I exclude financial institutions (SIC 
code 6000-6999) and other regulated industries (SIC code 4800-4900). I further delete firms with missing variables 
of interests for my regression models. I restrict the sample to those firms with at least one stock price quote available 
on Compustat or CRSP for the period to be classified as public equity firm-years, and have an S&P senior debt 
rating
4
 available on Compustat (Faulkender and Petersen 2006; Givoly et al. 2010) to be classified as public debt 
firm-years. Following Berkovitch et al. (2006), I exclude firms with less than $50 million of total debt (sum of short- 
and long-term debt).
5
 This may bias my sample toward larger and more leveraged firms. The sample selection 
procedures result in a sample consisting of 47,803 firm-year observations and 6,357 unique firms. 
                                                 
3 I limit my data to post-1987 since I want a more accurate measure of operating cash flows and accruals in the cash flow statement (Collins and 
Hribar 2000) and prior to 1987, cash flow from operations disclosed under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 95 (SFAS 95 
(1987)) is unavailable. 
4 When the S&P senior debt rating is not available, I considered an S&P rating on new debt issuance from Securities Data Company (SDC). 
5 Rating agencies rate all public debt issues with at least $50 million. Small fractions of debt less than $50 million may be rated. 
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Firms can go public with debt or with equity. Firms with publicly traded debt differ from firms with 
publicly traded equity in many aspects (Berkovitch et al. 2006; Givoly et al. 2010). Nonetheless, under Sections 13 
and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, both types of firms are subject to the same financial reporting 
requirements and regulations. These two types of firms face the similar reporting requirement but different capital 
market pressure. Therefore, it is a nice setting to isolate the impact of capital market pressure on managers’ tendency 
to engage in real earnings management to meet earnings targets. Firms that choose to access the public debt markets 
are relatively rare. Only about 17% - 20% of Compustat firms access the public debt markets (Faulkender and 
Petersen 2006).  
 
I classify firms into public equity and private equity (with public debt) firms. I classify a firm as a private 
equity firm with public debt if the firm has S&P senior debt rating and a non-zero amount of debentures on 
Compustat and/or the firm has information on new debt issuance on Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Global New 
Issues database. Public equity firms have stock price quotes available during the current year t either on Compustat 
or CRSP. Public debt is rare. Firms choose to go public with equity more than with debt (Faulkender and Petersen 
2006). However, public debt is becoming more common. 
 
Of the 47,803 firm-year observations of the final sample, I have 5,414 firm-year observations of 882 
distinct public debt firms and 42,389 firm-year observations of 5,805 distinct firms with public equity. Table 2 
presents the percentage of private equity and public equity firm-year observations across the sample periods of 1987 
and 2009.  
 
Table 1: Number Of Observations Of Sample Firms By Ownership Type 
  Private Equity Firms Public Equity Firms Total Sample 
Year No. of Obs. % of Sample No. of Obs. % of Sample No. of Obs. 
1987 164 10.6% 1,376 89.4% 1,540 
1988 192 11.9% 1,417 88.1% 1,609 
1989 229 13.9% 1,418 86.1% 1,647 
1990 245 14.4% 1,455 85.6% 1,700 
1991 232 14.0% 1,420 86.0% 1,652 
1992 206 12.0% 1,515 88.0% 1,721 
1993 207 11.6% 1,572 88.4% 1,779 
1994 206 11.0% 1,673 89.0% 1,879 
1995 200 9.9% 1,828 90.1% 2,028 
1996 204 9.4% 1,968 90.6% 2,172 
1997 201 8.6% 2,140 91.4% 2,341 
1998 227 9.2% 2,247 90.8% 2,474 
1999 222 8.9% 2,261 91.1% 2,483 
2000 269 11.0% 2,182 89.0% 2,451 
2001 304 12.8% 2,066 87.2% 2,370 
2002 330 14.2% 1,993 85.8% 2,323 
2003 338 14.9% 1,933 85.1% 2,271 
2004 299 13.1% 1,989 86.9% 2,288 
2005 270 11.9% 2,001 88.1% 2,271 
2006 240 10.5% 2,051 89.5% 2,291 
2007 210 9.1% 2,086 90.9% 2,296 
2008 220 9.6% 2,072 90.4% 2,292 
2009 199 10.3% 1,726 89.7% 1,925 
Total 5,414 11.3% 42,389 88.7% 47,803 
 
 I obtain an S&P credit rating data for the issuing firm from the Ratings section of Compustat North 
America Fundamentals Annual database.
6
 I use the public bond rating as a proxy for the firm’s financial distress 
(Plummer and Tse 1999). Firms with investment grade bonds (BBB or above) are classified as low default risk 
firms. To test my second hypothesis, I require that the firm must have publicly traded bonds and must have S&P 
senior bond ratings data available in Compustat. For this reason, I use a subset of my sample to test my second 
                                                 
6 Compustat has had S&P credit rating information available since 1985. S&P assigns long-term ratings for the issuer that measures a company’s 
ability to meet its financial obligations. S&P also assigns a debt rating to an individual debt issuance. 
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hypothesis. I compare two groups of firms: private equity firms with public debt and public equity firms with public 
debt and exclude public equity firms without public debt from consideration.  
 
Research Design 
 
 Using Roychowdhury’s (2006) broader definition of real earnings management, I consider other real 
activities that are often used to improve earnings. Managers may choose to boost the current period’s sales to meet 
the earnings targets. Sales discounts and lenient credit terms temporarily increase sales volume and total amount of 
sales revenue, but result in lower cash flows per sales dollar. Following Roychowdhury (2006), I estimate the 
normal level of cash flows from operations (CFO) by running the following regression model for every 2-digt SIC 
code and year: 
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where Assett-1 is the total assets of the period t-1, Salest the total sales during the period t, and ∆Sales the change in 
sales relative to the prior period. Abnormal cash flow from operations is the difference between the actual value and 
predicted cash flow from operations using the estimated coefficients from the above equation (1).  
 
 The firm may choose to overproduce to inflate earnings. Overproduction spreads the fixed costs over a 
larger number of units and reduces the cost of goods sold for the current year, but increases the margin for the given 
level of sales revenue. To estimate normal production costs, I first estimate the normal cost of goods sold (COGS) 
and normal level of inventory growth using the following two regressions for each industry (2-digit SIC code) and 
each year:  
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 where COGSt is cost of goods sold in year t, ∆INVt is the change in inventory in year t relative to year t-1, 
∆Salest-1 is the change in sales in year t-1 relative to year t-2 and Assett-1 is the change in total assets in year t-1 
relative to year t-2. Using (2) and (3), I estimate normal level of production costs (PROD) which is the sum of 
COGS and ∆INV. 
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 The abnormal production costs are the difference between the actual value and the normal value using the 
fitted values of the above regression. A higher abnormal value indicates the firm’s overproduction to lower cost of 
goods sold and inflates the current period earnings. 
 
 Firms facing small earnings decline or a small loss can meet earnings thresholds by cutting discretionary 
expenses. Consistent with Roychowdhury (2006), I define discretionary expense (DISEXP) as the sum of selling, 
general, and administrative expenses, R&D expenses and advertising expenses. Similarly, I estimate the normal 
level of discretionary expense and then subtract that from the actual amount of the expense to compute abnormal 
discretionary expense: 
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 I test the real earnings management behavior of firms near earnings thresholds using abnormal levels of 
cash flows, production costs and discretionary expenses estimated from cross-sectional regression equations (1), (4) 
and (5). The three measures are named as Abnormal CFO, Abnormal PROD and Abnormal DISEXP. In addition to 
the three real earnings management measures discussed above, I include one additional measure which is an 
aggregate of the three measures (Abnormal ALL) because the firm can alter more than one type of real activity 
simultaneously (Gunny 2010). In computing Abnormal ALL, I multiply Abnormal PROD by -1 so that the negative 
value is associated with opportunistic overproduction. Then, I take the sum of Abnormal CFO, Abnormal PROD 
multiplied by -1 and Abnormal DISEXP. 
 
The firm is a suspect firm if the firm’s income before extraordinary item scaled by lagged total assets is 
between 0 and 0.005 (See Roychowdhury 2006). Roychowdhury (2006) classifies a firm-year observation as suspect 
firm-year when the income is just right of zero. In this study suspect firm-years also include those firm-years that 
report small earnings increases in the current year as compared to the prior year.  That is, the firm is also a suspect 
firm if the change of income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets is between 0 and 0.005. An 
indicator variable, SUSPECT, equals one if the firm just meets zero or just beats the last year’s earnings, and zero 
otherwise. To test the association between meeting the earnings benchmarks and real earnings management and how 
that relationship is influenced by ownership structure, I estimate the following equations:  
 
Abnormal RM = ϒ0 +ϒ1PRIVATEi,t +ϒ2SUSPECT_PRIVATEi,t +ϒ3SUSPECT_PUBLICi,t +ϒ4SIZEi,t+ 
ϒ5LEVERAGEi,t +ϒ6ROAi,t +ϒ7SALESGROWTHv+ϒ8NOAi,t +ϒ9LOSSi,t 
+ϒ10INV_MILLSi,t + ε i,t  (6) 
 
where Abnormal RM is one of three measures of real earnings management estimated from (1), (4) and (5) and an 
aggregate of three measures. SUSPECT_PRIVATEi,t is 1 if a firm is classified as a private equity firm and just beats 
earnings benchmarks, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, SUSPECT_PUBLICEi,t  is 1 if a firm is classified as a public equity 
firm and just beats earnings benchmarks, and 0 otherwise. Regression equation (6) is a ordered group regression 
which tests the degree of earnings management between private equity firms and public equity firms. Low values of 
Abnormal CFO and Abnormal DISEXP and higher values of Abnormal PROD indicate higher levels of income-
increasing real earnings management. For Abnormal PROD, higher value is the result of real earnings management. 
A finding that ϒ3 < ϒ2 for Abnormal CFO, Abnormal DISEXP, and Abnormal ALL indicates that public equity 
firms alter operations to meet earnings benchmarks to a greater extent than private firms and would support H1. A 
finding that ϒ3 > ϒ2 for Abnormal PROD sample indicates that public equity firms are more likely than private 
equity firms to overproduce to meet earnings benchmarks. 
 
Private and public equity firms exhibit different firm characteristics that may affect firm’s real earnings 
management behavior and thus it is important to control for the endogeneity of the decision to hold private versus 
public equity. To control for the effect of firm characteristics, industry and the year, I employ a propensity score 
matched pair methodology in addition to Heckman (1979).
7
 Propensity score methodology assumes that firms that 
are similar in observable characteristics are similar in unobservable factors (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985). The 
treatment group consists of the firm-years that have the private equity with public debt and the control group 
consists of those with publicly traded equity. Each treatment observation is matched to each observation with the 
closest propensity score in the control sample. In a logit model, I obtain a propensity score that is the predicted 
probability of the decision to hold private equity with public debt given firm characteristics such as size, leverage, 
sales growth, quick ratio, firm age, big5 audit firms, operating cycle and cash to total asset ratio. Then, I use the 
propensity score to match firms. I match each of the private equity firm-years with a firm-year in the public equity 
firm samples that is (1) in the same year, (2) in the same industry (2-digit SIC code), (3) have similar firm size and 
                                                 
7 Francis and Lenox (2011) study selection problems in accounting research and suggest the propensity score methodology over the Heckman 
(1979) procedure. 
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leverage, and (4) have the smallest propensity score difference. These procedures result in 4,484 pairs of the 
matched-firm years.  
 
To test H2a I use a bond rating as a proxy for a firm’s financial distress and its default risk (Plummer and 
Tse 1999). Credit rating agencies consider various aspects of the firm when they issue the credit rating for the firm. 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) issues a credit rating for a firm after evaluating several aspects of business risks and 
financial risks (Standard & Poor’s 2008). Bond ratings are positively associated with reported earnings (Ashbaugh-
Skaife, Collins, and LaFond 2006; Ziebart and Reiter 1992) and corporate governance (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, 
and LaFond 2006). Firms with better earnings quality receive more favorable credit ratings and have a lower cost of 
debt (Ahmed et al. 2002). Evidence shows that firms with poor ratings and at risk of covenant violations are more 
likely to inflate earnings (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). Credit rating agencies rate firms near a debt covenant 
violation poorly and those firms are more likely to inflate earnings as compared to firms with good credit ratings 
(DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994).  
 
To test the relation between the firm’s financial distress and real earnings management and to test the 
relation between real earnings management and the public equity ownership under financial distress, I use an 
indicator variable (DEFAULT) equal to one if the firm has a non-investment-grade rating (BBB- or above) from 
S&P and zero, otherwise. Since this test requires a firm to have an S&P senior debt rating, public equity firms with 
private debt are excluded. I run equation (6) separately for high default risks firms and low default risks firms.  
 
In regression equation (6), I classify firm-year observations as suspect firms when the earnings just beat the 
zero earnings benchmark or the zero earnings growth benchmark. To test Hypothesis 2b, I further divide suspect 
firm-year observations into two different earnings benchmark categories: zero earnings benchmark and zero 
earnings growth benchmark. In doing so, I examine the relative importance of the two earnings benchmarks for 
private equity firms and for public equity firms. MEET_ZERO is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has 
small pretax income, and zero otherwise. MEET_LAST is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a small 
increase in earnings compared to the prior year, and zero otherwise. In order to investigate the likelihood of real 
earnings management to meet two different earnings benchmarks by private equity firms and public equity firms, I 
run the following two ordered group regressions separately: 
 
Abnormal RM =  ϒ0 + ϒ1PRIVATEi,t +ϒ2MEET_ZERO_PRIVATEi,t +ϒ3MEET_ZERO_PUBLICi,t+ 
ϒ4SIZEi,t + ϒ5LEVERAGEi,t  +ϒ6ROAi,t +ϒ7SALESGROWTHi,t +ϒ8NOAi,t + ϒ9LOSSi,t+ 
ϒ10INV_MILLSi,t + εi,t  (7) 
 
Abnormal RM =  ϒ0 + ϒ1PRIVATEi,t +ϒ2 MEET_LAST_PRIVATEi,t +ϒ3MEET_LAST_PUBLICi,t 
+ϒ4SIZEi,t+ϒ5LEVERAGEi,t+ϒ6ROAi,t+ϒ7SALESGROWTHi,t+ϒ8NOAi,t+ ϒ9LOSSi,t+ 
ϒ10INV_MILLSi,t + εi,t    (8) 
 
Control Variables 
 
 I include several control variables that are likely to influence a firm’s degree of real earnings management, 
some of which are the same variables used in the first stage model to capture the characteristics of the private equity 
with public debt firms. I measure the size of the firm (SIZE) as the natural logarithm of total assets to controls for 
the size effect. I control for the firm’s profitability by including return on assets (ROA), which is income before 
extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. I include sales growth (SALES_GROWTH) to capture firm 
performance. Firm’s incentives to manage earnings may be related to firm’s sales growth (SALES_GROWTH). 
Firm’s sales growth can also be a proxy for a firm’s life cycle stage. Higher sales growth is likely positively 
associated with higher growing firms (Anthony and Ramesh 1992). LEVERAGE controls for the firm’s factors that 
are associated with private equity (with public debt) firms. Leverage (LEVERAGE) is measured as the ratio of the 
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firm’s total debt to total assets. Leverage is expected to be positively associated with real earnings management and can be a proxy for the degree of shareholder-
bondholder conflicts because shareholder-bondholder conflicts increase with leverage (Ahmed et al. 2002).  Shareholders of leveraged firms have incentives to 
make risky investments to transfer wealth from bondholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). I include the inverse Mills ratio estimated from the Probit regression to 
control for endogeneity of the nature of the firm that goes public with debt, but not with its equity. 
 
Based on Barton and Simko (2002), I include net operating assets (NOA) as a measure of bloated balance sheets to control for the firm’s accruals 
management opportunities in my regression models because accruals management is an alternative approach to meeting earnings targets. Firms with higher 
NOAs are more constrained in their ability to manage earnings upwards. I measure NOA as net operating assets scaled by lagged sales.
8
  
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 presents the correlations among firm characteristics. An indicator variable, PRIVATE, is positively correlated with SIZE, LEVERAGE, 
PPEGT_AT and LOSS, and negatively correlated with ROA, SALES_GROWTH, OPERATYING_CYCLE, QUICK, and CASH_AT. That is, consistent with 
the literature, issuance of public debt is positively related with leverage and the ratio of property, plant and equipment to the total assets, but is negatively 
associated with sales growth, operating cycle, and cash holdings to the total assets ratio.  
 
Table 2: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
PRIVATE SIZE LEVERAGE ROA 
SALES 
GROWTH 
NOA LOSS FIRM AGE BIG5 
OPERATING 
CYCLE 
QUICK RNOA CASH_AT 
SIZE 0.045*** 
            
LEVERAGE 0.181*** -0.351*** 
           
ROA -0.023*** 0.222*** -0.383*** 
          
SALES 
_GROWTH 
-0.060*** -0.022*** -0.070*** 0.183*** 
         
NOA 0.001 -0.002 0.119*** -0.122*** -0.018*** 
        
LOSS 0.003 -0.225*** 0.337*** -0.634*** -0.189*** 0.087*** 
       
FIRM AGE 0.005 0.365*** -0.216*** 0.144*** -0.099*** -0.138*** -0.184*** 
      
BIG5 0.016*** 0.124*** -0.049*** 0.029*** -0.006 -0.023*** -0.019*** 0.007 
     
OPERATING 
_CYCLE 
-0.103*** -0.024*** -0.032*** -0.046*** -0.159*** 0.224*** 0.055*** -0.005 -0.038*** 
    
QUICK -0.058*** 0.019*** -0.010 -0.034*** 0.068*** 0.135*** 0.005*** -0.161*** 0.021*** -0.148*** 
   
RNOA 0.032*** 0.121*** -0.150*** 0.530*** 0.099** -0.091*** -0.353*** 0.088*** 0.002 -0.033*** -0.036*** 
  
CASH_AT -0.139*** -0.047*** -0.066*** -0.061*** 0.116*** 0.035*** 0.057*** -0.153*** 0.009* 0.076*** 0.366*** -0.044*** 
 
PPEGT_AT 0.098*** 0.090*** -0.018*** 0.095*** 0.136*** 0.078*** -0.112*** 0.081*** -0.016*** -0.318*** 0.119*** 0.051*** -0.155*** 
 *, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
                                                 
8 Alternatively, I use discretionary accruals based on Modified Jones Model (Jones 1991) as described in Dechow et al. (1995). For each industry (2-digit SIC code) and each year, I estimate firm-
specific normal accruals. Then, discretionary accruals are total accruals less normal accruals. The results of using discretionary accruals instead of a bloated balance sheet measure by Barton and Simko 
(2002) are qualitatively similar. 
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Private equity firms with public debt and public equity firms exhibit different innate firm characteristics. 
Prior literature finds that the firms that go public with debt only are more leveraged, are more R&D intensive and 
have a higher ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets. The firms with both public debt and public 
equity are older, bigger, and more profitable compared to the private equity firms (Berkovitch et al. 2006; Givoly et 
al. 2010). Table 3 Panel A provides descriptive data about firm characteristics of two groups of the sample firms: 
private equity firms and public equity firms. I present a two-tailed t-test and a Wilcoxon rank-sum test for 
differences across two groups of the firms. For the full sample, it is evident that public equity firm-years are 
significantly more leveraged and less profitable than all public firm-years. Private equity firms have shorter 
operating cycles, lower cash holdings, and higher ratios of PP&E to total assets than the public firms. Additionally, 
private equity firms are more constrained in terms of free cash flows and available funds for the firm’s operations.  
 
Table 3 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics Of The Firms By Two Ownership Type Two Groups 
Variable 
 
Private Equity Firms Public Equity Firms 
Difference in 
Mean / Median 
SIZE Mean 7.344 7.125 0.219*** 
 
Median 7.300 6.924 0.377*** 
LEVERAGE Mean 50.1% 37.1% 0.131*** 
 
Median 39.4% 33.7% 0.057*** 
NOA Mean 0.203 0.201 0.003 
 
Median -0.024 0.002 -0.027*** 
SALES_GROWTH Mean 2.2% 6.9% -0.047*** 
 
Median 3.5% 7.5% -0.040*** 
ROA Mean 1.6% 2.4% -0.008*** 
 
Median 2.9% 3.8% -0.009*** 
No. of Obs. 
 
5,414 42,389 
 No. of Firms 
 
882 5,805 
  
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of the Firms by Two Ownership Type Three Groups 
 Variable   
Private Equity 
Firms with 
Public Debt 
(1) 
Public Equity 
Firms with 
Private Debt 
(2) 
Public Equity 
Firms with 
Public Debt 
(3) 
Difference in 
Mean / Median 
(1)-(2) 
Difference in 
Mean / Median 
(1)-(3) 
SIZE Mean 7.344 6.448 7.778 0.896*** -0.434*** 
 
Median 6.385 8.385 10.385 -2.000*** -4.000*** 
LEVERAGE Mean 50.1% 37.3% 36.8% 0.128*** 0.133*** 
 
Median 39.4% 33.5% 33.9% 0.059*** 0.055*** 
NOA Mean 0.203 0.296 0.109 -0.092*** 0.094*** 
 
Median -0.024 0.023 -0.014 -0.048*** -0.011 
SALES_GROWTH Mean 2.2% 9.0% 4.9% -0.068*** -0.027*** 
 
Median 3.5% 9.0% 6.4% -0.056*** -0.029*** 
ROA Mean 1.6% 1.9% 3.0% -0.003* -0.014*** 
 
Median 2.9% 3.7% 3.9% -0.008*** -0.010*** 
No. of Obs. 
 
5,414 20,807 21,582 
  
No. of Firms 
 
882 4,520 2,743 
  
*, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  I present two-tailed t-test for mean differences and Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test for median differences across three groups. 
 
Panel B of Table 3 provides descriptive data about three groups of my sample: private equity firms with 
public debt, public equity firms with private debt and public equity firms with public debt. Private equity firms with 
publicly traded debt firm-years are significantly smaller in size, more leveraged, and less profitable than firms with 
both public equity and public debt. Public equity firms with private debt have shorter operating cycles, lower cash 
holdings, and a higher ratio of PP&E to total assets than all public firms. Firms with public equity but with private 
debt are the smallest, but have the most growth opportunities among three groups of the sample.  
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Empirical Analysis 
 
 In the first-stage, I run a probit regression (results not tabulated). I use the estimates from the first-stage 
probit model to compute the inverse Mills’ ratio for each firm and include it as an additional control variable in my 
analysis. Consistent with Katz (2009), private firms are younger, more leveraged and have a shorter operating cycle. 
Private equity firms also show fewer growth opportunities and have lower cash to assets ratio.  
 
Table 4 shows regression results of equation (6) for the full sample, which test hypothesis H1. Results of 
real earnings management as a consequence of just meeting small positive income and beating last year’s earnings 
between two groups of firms that are private equity firms and public equity firms are presented in Panel A of Table 
4. The first column is the regression result of the abnormal level of sales for two groups of firms. The coefficient on 
SUSPECT_PRIVATE (ϒ2) is statistically insignificant, but the coefficient on SUSPECT_PUBLIC (ϒ3) is negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level for Abnormal CFO. Overall, the regression outcome for abnormal cash 
flows suggests sales manipulation occurs more frequently for public firms. 
 
The second column is the regression result of the abnormal level of production between two groups of 
firms. Higher amounts of Abnormal PROD mean more opportunistic overproduction to lower the cost of sales. The 
coefficient SUSPECT_PRIVATE (ϒ2) is insignificant. The coefficient SUSPECT_PUBLIC (ϒ3) is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. That is, private equity firms engage in less overproduction to lower cost of sales per 
product to satisfy earnings benchmarks. The third column reports the results of firm’s ownership type on the level of 
abnormal discretionary expense. Discretionary expense is the sum of R&D expenditures, SG&A expenses and 
advertising expenses. Coefficients on both groups, SUSPECT_PRIVATE (ϒ2) and SUSPECT2_PUBLIC (ϒ2), are 
negative and significant. This indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the two groups of 
firms. In other words, it appears that public equity firms and private equity firms do not differ in managing 
discretionary expenses to meet earnings benchmarks. The regression outcomes of real earnings management 
behavior using an aggregate of three measures (Abnormal ALL) by two types of firms is in the fourth column. The 
coefficient on SUSPECT_PRIVATE (ϒ2) is positive and insignificant, but the coefficient on SUSPECT_PUBLIC 
(ϒ3) is negative and significant at the 1% level. This result confirms the finding that the firms that go public with 
debt, but not with their equity, attain their earnings goals significantly less through manipulation of real activities 
than those firms that become public with equity. 
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Table 4 
Panel A: Cross-sectional Regressions of Abnormal Real Earnings Management Measures by Ownership Types  (Two Groups): Full Sample 
Abnormal RM = ϒ0+ϒ1PRIVATEi,t + ϒ2SUSPECT_PRIVATEi,t + ϒ3SUSPECT_PUBLICi,t + ϒ4SIZEi,t + ϒ5LEVERAGEi,t +ϒ6ROAi,t +ϒ7SALES_GROWTHi,t + ϒ8NOAi,t + 
ϒ9LOSSi,t  + ϒ10INV_MILLSi,t + εi,t 
Variable 
 
Abnormal CFO Abnormal PROD Abnormal DISEXP Abnormal ALL 
Intercept ϒ0 -0.003 0.148*** -0.183*** -0.301*** 
  
(-0.48) (9.01) (-9.35) (-9.22) 
PRIVATE ϒ1 -0.003* -0.005 -0.003 0.014 
  
(-1.66) (-1.00) (-0.35) (1.51) 
SUSPECT_PRIVATE ϒ2 0.003 -0.002 -0.025** 0.003 
  
(1.30) (-0.47) (-2.36) (0.34) 
SUSPECT_PUBLIC ϒ3 -0.007*** 0.013*** -0.014*** -0.026*** 
  
(-6.50) (4.55) (-4.06) (-5.07) 
SIZE ϒ4 -0.003*** -0.003** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
  
(-5.93) (-2.18) (6.33) (3.66) 
LEVERAGE ϒ5 0.010* -0.106*** 0.030* 0.122*** 
  
(1.94) (-8.85) (1.93) (5.13) 
ROA ϒ6 0.325*** -0.506*** -0.068** 0.725*** 
  
(19.69) (-20.38) (-2.24) (15.17) 
SALEGS_GROWTH ϒ7 -0.018*** -0.032*** 0.096*** 0.091*** 
  
(-6.26) (-6.35) (16.54) (10.04) 
NOA ϒ8 0.001 -0.001 -0.007*** -0.003 
  
(0.95) (-1.21) (-6.03) (-1.33) 
LOSS ϒ9 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 
  
(-1.43) (-1.09) (-0.80) (-1.00) 
INV_MILLS ϒ 10 0.007*** -0.035*** 0.051*** 0.084*** 
  
(4.18) (-10.86) (12.46) (12.92) 
Statistical Test: 
     
F-test: ϒ2 = ϒ3  
18.50*** 8.68** 0.98 9.0** 
Adj. R2 
 
15.50% 10.00% 6.50% 9.10% 
N 
 
42,548 45,250 36,448 45,222 
This table presents results of ordered group regression which tests real earnings management for public and private firms. SUSPECT_PRIVATE is one if the firm is suspicious in engaging 
real earnings management (SUSPECT) and a private equity firm and zero, otherwise. SUSPECT_PUBLIC is one if the firm is suspicious in engaging real earnings management (SUSPECT) 
and a public equity firm with or without publicly traded debt and zero, otherwise. All other variable definitions are in Appendix A. *, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, 
respectively. The t-values are computed using robust standard errors for firm clusters. 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional Regressions of Abnormal Real Earnings Management Measures by Ownership Types (Three Groups): Full Sample 
Abnormal RM = ϒ0+ϒ1PRIVATEi,t + ϒ2PUBLICi,t+ ϒ3SUSPECT_PRIVATEi,t  +ϒ4SUSPECT_PUBLICi,t + ϒ5SUSPECT_BOTHi,t   
+ ϒ6SIZEit + ϒ7LEVERAGEi,t + ϒ8ROAi,t + ϒ9SALES_GROWTHi,t  + ϒ10NOAi,t + ϒ11LOSSi,t,t + ϒ12INV_MILLSi + εi,t 
Variable 
 
Abnormal CFO Abnormal PROD Abnormal DISEXP Abnormal ALL 
Intercept ϒ0 -0.007 0.130*** -0.189*** -0.292*** 
  
(-0.98) (7.41) (-8.77) (-8.39) 
PRIVATE ϒ1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.012 
  
(-0.75) (-0.29) (-0.11) (1.20) 
PUBLIC_EQUITY ϒ2 0.003** 0.010** -0.001 -0.007 
  
(2.13) (2.26) (-0.13) (-0.85) 
SUSPECT_PRIVATE ϒ3 0.003 -0.003 -0.026** 0.004 
  
(1.52) (-0.82) (-2.49) (0.45) 
SUSPECT_PUBLIC ϒ4 -0.009*** 0.020*** -0.019*** -0.039*** 
  
(-4.78) (4.27) (-3.48) (-4.64) 
SUSPECT_BOTH ϒ5 -0.004*** 0.004 -0.008** -0.011* 
  
(-3.63) (1.29) (-1.97) (-1.81) 
SIZE ϒ6 -0.002*** -0.001 0.010*** 0.008*** 
  
(-4.94) (-0.92) (5.64) (2.86) 
LEVERAGE ϒ7 0.010* -0.102*** 0.029* 0.119*** 
  
(1.85) (-8.45) (1.88) (4.97) 
ROA ϒ8 0.364*** -0.574*** -0.032 0.858*** 
  
(22.95) (-22.18) (-1.05) (17.18) 
SALEGS_GROWTH ϒ9 -0.020*** -0.034*** 0.080*** 0.081*** 
  
(-6.86) (-7.34) (14.63) (9.78) 
NOA ϒ10 -0.000** -0.000* 0 0 
  
(-2.45) (-1.71) (0.85) (-0.86) 
LOSS ϒ11 0.001 -0.013*** -0.001 0.008 
  
(0.52) (-3.37) (-0.28) (1.17) 
INV_MILLS ϒ12 0.006*** -0.034*** 0.051*** 0.083*** 
  
(3.69) (-10.63) (12.38) (12.81) 
Statistical Test: 
     
    F-test: ϒ3= ϒ4  
18.55*** 13.70*** 0.37 13.12*** 
    F-test: ϒ3 = ϒ5  
10.66*** 2.07 2.62 2.1 
    F-test: ϒ4 = ϒ5  
3.71* 7.89*** 2.56 7.51*** 
Adj. R2 
 
15.40% 10.20% 6.20% 9.40% 
N 
 
42,548 45,250 36,448 45,222 
This table presents results of ordered group regression which tests real earnings management tendency for public equity, private equity with public debt, and firms with both public equity 
and public debt In this regression, I classify firms into three groups: private equity firms with public debt, private equity firms without public debt and firms with both public equity and 
debt. SUSPECT_PRIVATE is 1 if the firm is a suspicious of engaging in earnings management and has private equity with public debt, and 0 otherwise. SUSPECT_PUBLIC is 1 if the 
firm is suspicious of engaging in earnings management and has public equity, but don't have public debt and 0 otherwise. SUSPECT_BOTH is 1 if the firm is suspicious of engaging in 
earnings management and has both public equity and public debt, and 0 otherwise. All other variable definitions are in Appendix A.. *, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, 
respectively. The t-values are computed using robust standard errors for firm clusters. 
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Panel B of Table 4 presents results for the three group classification. The coefficient on 
SUSPECT_PRIVATE (ϒ3) is insignificant except for Abnormal DISEXP sample, but the coefficient on 
SUSPECT_PUBLIC (ϒ4) and SUSPECT_BOTH (ϒ5) are significant in the direction of more abnormal real 
operating activities. However, abnormal levels of real earnings management are lower for firms with both public 
debt and equity than for public equity firms with private debt. This may be interpreted that the existence of both 
shareholders and bondholders plays a governance role.  
 
Using propensity score matched-pairs for the treatment and the control samples, I find that public equity 
firms are more likely to push sales and overproduce to inflate the current period earnings. Consistent with the full 
sample result, I find that both private equity firms and public equity firms manage discretionary expenses to meet 
their earnings benchmarks. The findings for propensity-matched pairs are statistically and qualitatively similar as the 
regression outcome using the full sample. Overall, I conclude that the public equity ownership puts earnings 
pressures on firms to which they respond by altering operations to meet their near-term earnings targets. 
 
Table 5 presents results that compare real earnings management behavior between private equity and public 
equity firms based on propensity score matching methodology. Each private equity firm is matched to the 
observation with the closest propensity score in the public equity sample. The results in Panel A of Table 5 are 
qualitatively similar to the results found for the full sample. The coefficients of SUSPECT_PRIVATE (ϒ2) are 
insignificant for Abnormal CFO, Abnormal PROD, and Abnormal ALL models, but the coefficients on 
SUSPECT_PUBLIC (ϒ3) are significant at 1% level for Abnormal CFO, Abnormal PROD, and Abnormal ALL 
models. The coefficients of SUSPECT_PRIVATE (ϒ2) and SUSPECT_PUBLIC (ϒ3) for Abnormal DISEXP are 
significant for both private equity and public equity firms. This may indicate that managing discretionary expense is 
less costly and thus the most preferred choice by managers to meet earnings benchmarks both for private and for 
public equity firms. 
 
 Panel B of Table 5 presents results of the three group analysis. Except Abnormal DISEXP measure of real 
earnings management, I find that public equity firms are more likely to manage real activities to meet earnings 
benchmarks.  
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Table 5 
Panel A: Cross-sectional Regressions of Abnormal Real Earnings Management Measures by Ownership Types (Two 
Groups): Propensity Score Matched-Pairs 
Abnormal RM = ϒ0+ϒ1PRIVATEi,t + ϒ2SUSPECT2_PRIVATEi,t + ϒ3SUSPECT2_PUBLICi,t  + ϒ4SIZEi,t + ϒ5LEVERAGEi,t  
+ ϒ6ROAi,t + ϒ7SALES_GROWTHi,t + ϒ8NOAi,t  + ϒ9LOSSi,t + εi,t 
Variable 
 
Abnormal CFO Abnormal PROD Abnormal DISEXP Abnormal All 
Intercept ϒ0 0.016*** 0.052*** -0.009 -0.035 
  
(2.59) (3.58) (-0.33) (-1.25) 
PRIVATE ϒ1 -0.005*** 0.012** -0.026*** -0.026*** 
  
(-2.77) (2.37) (-2.69) -(2.69) 
SUSPECT_PRIVATE ϒ2 0.002 0.000 -0.027*** -0.005 
  
(1.05) (-0.07) (-2.61) -(0.66) 
SUSPECT_PUBLIC ϒ3 -0.007*** 0.012*** -0.018* -0.026*** 
  
(-3.89) (3.23) (-1.86) -(3.65) 
SIZE ϒ4 -0.003*** 0.000 0.003 0.00 
  
(-4.77) (-0.27) (0.96) (-0.10) 
LEVERAGE ϒ5 -0.004 -0.075*** -0.029 0.026 
  
(-0.58) (-4.28) (-1.25) (0.75) 
ROA ϒ6 0.297*** -0.460*** -0.072 0.686*** 
  
(9.54) (-9.73) (-1.19) (7.14) 
SALEGS_GROWTH ϒ7 -0.006 -0.024*** 0.108*** 0.067*** 
  
(-1.34) (-3.55) (7.85) (4.99) 
NOA ϒ8 0.001* -0.005** -0.002 0.006** 
  
(1.68) (-2.47) (-1.02) (2.11) 
LOSS ϒ9 -0.011*** 0.009 -0.011 -0.033*** 
  
(-3.09) (1.51) (-1.32) (-2.79) 
Statistical Test: 
         F-test: ϒ2 = ϒ3 
 
12.26*** 5.04** 0.43 0.05* 
Adj. R2 
 
18.10% 9.20% 3.40% 8.40% 
N 
 
8,626 8,968 4,107 8,966 
I examine the influence of public equity ownership for two groups of firms: public equity firms and private equity firms. Here, I match 
each of the private equity firm-years with a firm-year in the public equity firm samples that are (1) in the same year, (2) in the same 
industry (2-digit SIC code), (3) have firm size and leverage within   25%, and (4) have the smallest propensity score difference. These 
procedures result in 4,484 pairs of the matched-firm years. The number of matched pairs used for each of four real earnings 
management measure varies. SUSPECT_PRIVATE is one if the firm is suspicious in engaging real earnings management (SUSPECT) 
and a private equity firm and zero, otherwise. SUSPECT_PUBLIC is one if the firm is suspicious in engaging real earnings 
management (SUSPECT) and a public equity firm with or without publicly traded debt and zero, otherwise. All other variable 
definitions are in Appendix A. *, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. The t-values are computed using robust 
standard errors for firm clusters. 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional Regressions of Abnormal Real Earnings Management Measures by Ownership Types (Three 
Groups): Propensity Score Matched-Pairs 
Abnormal RM = ϒ0+ϒ1PRIVATEi,t + ϒ2PUBLICi,t + ϒ3SUSPECT_PRIVATEi,t + ϒ4SUSPECT_PUBLIC,t + ϒ5SUSPECT 
_BOTHi,t + ϒ6SIZEi,t + ϒ7LEVERAGEi,t + ϒ8ROAi,t + ϒ9SALES_GROWTHi,t +ϒ10NOAi,t + εi,t 
Variable 
 
Abnormal CFO Abnormal PROD Abnormal DISEXP Abnormal ALL 
Intercept ϒ0 0.020*** 0.047*** -0.018 -0.03 
  
(2.96) (3.09) (-0.62) (-1.06) 
PRIVATE ϒ1 -0.004** 0.012** -0.023** -0.024** 
  
(-2.07) (2.25) (-2.22) (-2.35) 
PUBLIC_EQUITY ϒ2 0.001 0 0.008 0.006 
  
(0.48) (-0.05) (0.71) (0.42) 
SUSPECT_PRIVATE ϒ3 0.001 0.000 -0.026** -0.005 
  
(0.72) (-0.01) (-2.55) (-0.72) 
SUSPECT_PUBLIC ϒ4 -0.013*** 0.021*** -0.030** -0.043*** 
  
(-3.70) (2.67) (-2.00) (-3.08) 
SUSPECT_BOTH ϒ5 -0.005** 0.008* -0.007 -0.017** 
  
(-2.20) (1.94) (-0.60) (-2.15) 
SIZE ϒ6 -0.003*** -0.001 0.003 0.001 
  
(-4.32) (-0.70) (1.09) (0.33) 
LEVERAGE ϒ7 -0.008 -0.071*** -0.026 0.02 
  
(-1.20) (-4.00) (-1.11) (0.56) 
ROA ϒ8 0.221*** -0.368*** -0.04 0.545*** 
  
(5.67) (-6.90) (-0.71) (5.40) 
SALEGS_GROWTH ϒ9 -0.002 -0.035*** 0.102*** 0.082*** 
  
(-0.48) (-4.92) (7.44) (5.95) 
NOA ϒ10 0 -0.001 -0.002 0.002* 
  
(0.21) (-1.43) (-1.45) (1.84) 
LOSS ϒ11 -0.019*** 0.019*** -0.008 -0.049*** 
  
(-4.30) (2.85) (-0.91) (-3.81) 
Statistical Test: 
     
    F-test: ϒ3= ϒ4  
12.87*** 95.37** 0.04 5.20** 
    F-test: ϒ3 = ϒ5  
4.63** 2.02 1.53 1.13 
    F-test: ϒ4 = ϒ5  
4.29** 2.09 1.51 2.26 
Adj. R2 
 
16.00% 8.40% 3.40% 7.90% 
N 
 
8,626 8,968 4,107 8,966 
In this regression, I classify firms into three groups: private equity firms with public debt, private equity firms without public debt and 
firms with both public equity and debt. SUSPECT_PRIVATE is 1 if the firm is a suspicious of engaging in earnings management and 
has private equity with public debt, and 0 otherwise. SUSPECT_PUBLIC is 1 if the firm is suspicious of engaging in earnings 
management and has public equity, but don't have public debt, and 0 otherwise. SUSPECT_BOTH is 1 if the firm is suspicious of 
engaging in earnings management and has both public equity and public debt, and 0 otherwise. Here, I match each of the private 
equity firm-years with a firm-year in the public equity firm samples that are (1) in the same year, (2) in the same industry (2-digit SIC 
code), (3) have firm size and leverage within   25%, and (4) have the smallest propensity score difference. These procedures result in 
4,484 pairs of the matched-firm years. The number of matched pairs used for each of four real earnings management measure varies. 
All other variable definitions are in Appendix A. *, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. The t-values are 
computed using robust standard errors for firm clusters. 
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Table 6 present empirical findings that test Hypothesis 2a. When the firm is financially distressed, earnings 
changes become more relevant to the bondholders because bondholders are fixed claimants. Thus, I expect that 
private equity with public debt firms have incentives to manipulate real operations of the firm to satisfy earnings 
benchmarks.  
 
Panel A of Table 6 presents evidence that both private equity and public equity firms manage their 
operating activities to meet earnings thresholds when they are financially weak. For the high default risk firm 
sample, coefficients of SUSPECT_PRIVATE and SUSPECT_PUBLIC are significant in the direction of more real 
earnings manipulation. Unlike for the high default firm sample, the coefficients of SUSPECT_PRIVATE are not 
significant for three real earnings management measures, but the coefficients of SUSPECT2_PUBLIC are 
significant for all four measures of real earnings management. A finding of ϒ3 < ϒ2 (ϒ3 > ϒ2 for Abnormal PROD) 
for low default firms indicates that public equity firms engage in more real earnings management to meet earnings 
benchmarks than do private equity firms when they are financially strong. F-test shows a difference between private 
equity and public equity firms in their likelihood of using real earnings management for low default risk sample. 
When the firm is financially healthy, private equity firms seem less likely to manage real operations measured by 
real earnings metrics suggested by Roychowdhury (2006) compared to public equity firms.  
 
Panel B of Table 6 reports the results of the regression that test real earnings management behavior by high 
default versus low default firms using propensity score matching methodology. The regression outcome using 
propensity score matched-pairs shows that private firms manage real activities more actively than do the public 
equity firms when the firms’ default risk increases. For low default risk group, the public equity firms manage real 
activities more (Abnormal DISEXP and Abnormal ALL) than do private equity firms. Significant F-test for low 
default firms reconfirms findings in Table 13. However, the evidence is weak and mixed using the propensity score 
matched-pairs. 
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Table 6 
Panel A: Cross-sectional Regressions of Abnormal Real Earnings Management Measures for High Default Risk vs. Low Default Risk Firms: Full Sample 
  
High Default Risk Firms Low Default Risk Firms 
Variable 
 
Abnormal 
CFO 
Abnormal 
PROD 
Abnormal 
DISEXP 
Abnormal 
ALL 
Abnormal 
CFO 
Abnormal 
PROD 
Abnormal 
DISEXP 
Abnormal 
ALL 
Intercept ϒ0 0.041*** 0.060** -0.139*** -0.146** -0.036*** 0.215*** -0.209*** -0.434*** 
  
(2.92) (2.00) (-3.88) (-2.38) (-3.16) (6.46) (-4.56) (-6.38) 
PRIVATE ϒ1 0.001 -0.003 0.004 0.011 0.000 0.001 -0.025* 0.005 
  
(0.32) (-0.38) (0.39) (0.69) (-0.22) (0.18) (-1.93) (0.50) 
SUSPECT_PRIVATE ϒ2 -0.010** 0.024** -0.029** -0.056*** 0.003 -0.005** 0.011 0.008** 
  
(-2.28) (2.39) (-2.53) (-2.86) (1.64) (-2.43) (0.73) (1.97) 
SUSPECT_PUBLIC ϒ3 -0.015*** 0.014** -0.009 -0.036*** -0.003** 0.008** -0.010* -0.017** 
  
(-5.16) (2.35) (-1.55) (-3.12) (-2.22) (2.23) (-1.81) (-2.36) 
SIZE ϒ4 -0.006*** 0.005* 0.006** -0.003 -0.001 -0.004* 0.007** 0.009** 
  
(-5.62) (1.84) (2.10) (-0.62) (-0.85) (-1.69) (2.04) (2.06) 
LEVERAGE ϒ5 -0.006 -0.099*** 0.034 0.109*** 0.01 -0.147*** 0.104*** 0.246*** 
  
(-0.69) (-4.84) (1.40) (2.62) (0.99) (-4.83) (2.62) (4.09) 
ROA ϒ6 0.103* -0.104 -0.153*** 0.051 0.421*** -0.857*** 0.330*** 1.599*** 
  
(1.82) (-1.34) (-3.31) (0.30) (18.74) (-12.89) (4.41) (11.75) 
SALEGS_GROWTH ϒ7 -0.009* -0.039*** 0.076*** 0.098*** -0.021*** 0.017** 0.070*** -0.011 
  
(-1.88) (-5.09) (9.41) (6.49) (-5.07) (2.11) (6.15) (-0.70) 
NOA ϒ8 0.001 -0.006*** 0.00 0.005 0.002* -0.004 -0.010** 0.002 
  
(0.48) (-2.96) (-0.23) (1.41) (1.76) (-1.19) (-2.32) (0.39) 
LOSS ϒ9 -0.033*** 0.051*** -0.022*** -0.103*** -0.010*** 0.039*** -0.049*** -0.098*** 
  
(-4.21) (4.46) (-2.86) (-4.18) (-4.30) (5.16) (-4.59) (-6.37) 
INV_MILLS ϒ10 0.001 -0.024*** 0.038*** 0.058*** 0.015*** -0.069*** 0.078*** 0.154*** 
  
(0.32) (-4.92) (5.72) (5.28) (4.35) (-7.68) (7.40) (8.04) 
Statistical Test: 
         
    F-test: ϒ2 = ϒ3  
1.07 0.82 2.55 0.86 7.17*** 10.02*** 1.70 9.47*** 
Adj. R2 
 
12.20% 6.80% 7.20% 5.40% 18.30% 15.20% 8.50% 15.60% 
N 
 
10,562 0,963 10,050 10,961 13,274 13,864 8,706 13,862 
I run equation (6) separately for high default firms and low default firms. SUSPECT_PRIVATE is one if the firm is suspicious in engaging real earnings management (SUSPECT) and a 
private equity firm and zero, otherwise. SUSPECT_PUBLIC is one if the firm is suspicious in engaging real earnings management (SUSPECT) and a public equity firm with or without 
publicly traded debt and zero, otherwise. All other variable definitions are in Appendix A. *, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. The t-values are computed 
using robust standard errors for firm clusters. 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional Regressions of Abnormal Real Earnings Management Measures for High Default Risk vs. Low Default Risk Firms: Propensity Score 
Matched-Pairs 
  High Default Risk Firms Low Default Risk Firms 
Variable 
 
Abnormal 
CFO 
Abnormal 
PROD 
Abnormal 
DISEXP 
Abnormal 
ALL 
Abnormal 
CFO 
Abnormal 
PROD 
Abnormal 
DISEXP 
Abnormal 
ALL 
Intercept ϒ0 0.032** -0.003 0.014 0.044 -0.001 0.099*** -0.077 -0.128*** 
 
 
(2.53) (-0.09) (0.33) (0.65) (-0.16) (5.05) (-1.54) (-3.71) 
PRIVATE ϒ1 -0.002 0.013 -0.011 -0.021 -0.004** 0.008** -0.047*** -0.018** 
 
 
(-0.52) (1.26) (-0.93) (-1.07) (-2.00) (1.97) (-2.75) (-2.38) 
SUSPECT_PRIVATE ϒ2 -0.002 0.018* -0.030*** -0.049** 0.003 -0.005*** -0.003 0.009** 
 
 
(-0.53) (1.72) (-2.60) (-2.48) (1.55) (-3.23) (-0.19) (2.47) 
SUSPECT_PUBLIC ϒ3 -0.016*** -0.001 0.002 -0.015 -0.001 0.006 -0.026* -0.013* 
 
 
(-2.76) (-0.08) (0.12) (-0.63) (-0.63) (1.60) (-1.78) (-1.84) 
SIZE ϒ4 -0.006*** 0.008** -0.002 -0.014* -0.001* -0.004*** 0.007 0.004* 
 
 
(-4.26) (2.09) (-0.43) (-1.94) (-1.68) (-3.46) (1.49) (1.79) 
LEVERAGE ϒ5 0.002 -0.075*** -0.039 0.029 -0.009 -0.088** 0.086 0.127* 
 
 
(0.23) (-3.03) (-1.32) (0.58) (-0.89) (-2.19) (1.18) (1.71) 
ROA ϒ6 0.216*** -0.325*** -0.071 0.454*** 0.503*** -0.935*** 0.228 1.656*** 
 
 
(5.67) (-5.32) (-1.06) (4.06) (7.91) (-4.99) (1.06) (5.12) 
SALEGS_GROWTH ϒ7 -0.011 -0.033*** 0.099*** 0.099*** -0.006 0.005 0.107*** -0.002 
 
 
(-1.26) (-2.65) (5.26) (3.92) (-1.19) (0.96) (3.52) (-0.22) 
NOA ϒ8 0.001 -0.009** 0.002 0.011* 0.000 -0.001 -0.007 -0.001 
 
 
(0.79) (-2.15) (0.43) (1.83) (-0.09) (-0.36) (-1.12) (-0.12) 
LOSS ϒ9 -0.020*** 0.021** -0.013 -0.056*** 0.004 -0.005 -0.008 0.01 
 
 
(-4.56) (2.49) (-1.24) (-3.39) (0.66) (-0.39) (-0.40) (0.38) 
Statistical Test:          
    F-test: ϒ2 = ϒ3  3.68* 1.38 2.57 1.25 2.14 7.53*** 1.25 7.33*** 
Adj. R2  15.60% 7.70% 2.70% 6.40% 17.30% 20.10% 6.80% 17.80% 
N  2,832 2,899 2,459 2,898 4,155 4,313 617 4,312 
I run equation (6) separately for high default firms and low default firms. I match each of the private equity firm-years with a firm-year in the public equity firm samples that are (1) in the 
same year, (2) in the same industry (2-digit SIC code), (3) have firm size and leverage within   25%, and (4) have the smallest propensity score difference. These procedures result in 
4,484 pairs of the matched-firm years. The number of matched pairs used for each of four real earnings management measure varies. . SUSPECT_PRIVATE is one if the firm is 
suspicious in engaging real earnings management (SUSPECT) and a private equity firm and zero, otherwise. SUSPECT_PUBLIC is one if the firm is suspicious in engaging real earnings 
management (SUSPECT) and a public equity firm with or without publicly traded debt and zero, otherwise. All other variable definitions are in Appendix A. *, **, *** indicates 10%, 
5%, and 1% significance, respectively. The t-values are computed using robust standard errors for firm clusters. 
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Table 7 
Panel A: Cross-sectional Regressions of Abnormal Real Earnings Management Measures for Zero Earnings and Zero Earnings Growth Benchmark: Full Sample 
  
BEAT_ZERO BEAT_LAST 
Variable 
 
Abnormal 
CFO 
Abnormal 
PROD 
Abnormal 
DISEXP 
Abnormal 
ALL 
Abnormal CFO 
Abnormal 
PROD 
Abnormal 
DISEXP 
Abnormal 
ALL 
Intercept ϒ0 0.024** 0.105*** -0.181*** -0.233*** 0.024** 0.105*** -0.181*** -0.233*** 
  
(2.54) (5.70) (-9.23) (-6.87) (2.53) (5.67) (-9.23) (-6.85) 
PRIVATE ϒ1 -0.002 -0.006 -0.003 0.017** -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 0.015 
  
(-1.20) (-1.43) (-0.38) (2.06) (-1.27) (-1.10) (-0.35) (1.59) 
BEAT_ZERO_PRIVATE ϒ2 -0.019*** 0.045*** -0.029* -0.092*** 
    
  
(-3.06) (3.56) (-1.79) (-3.81) 
    BEAT_ZERO_PUBLIC ϒ3 -0.027*** 0.050*** -0.020*** -0.095*** 
    
  
(-9.20) (7.88) (-3.23) (-8.55) 
    BEAT_LAST_PRIVATE ϒ4 
    
-0.001 0.000 -0.02 0.003 
      
(-0.38) (-0.01) (-1.61) (0.41) 
BEAT_LAST_PUBLIC ϒ5 
    
-0.007*** 0.012*** -0.011*** -0.022*** 
      
(-5.85) (3.88) (-2.99) (-3.93) 
SIZE ϒ6 -0.003*** -0.003** 0.010*** 0.010*** -0.003*** -0.003** 0.010*** 0.011*** 
  
(-5.19) (-2.21) (6.32) (3.64) (-5.03) (-2.29) (6.35) (3.70) 
LEVERAGE ϒ7 -0.011 -0.074*** 0.027* 0.070*** -0.012* -0.072*** 0.026 0.066*** 
  
(-1.63) (-5.70) (1.70) (2.85) (-1.78) (-5.50) (1.64) (2.68) 
ROA ϒ8 0.074** -0.114** -0.065* 0.116** 0.075** -0.115** -0.064* 0.118** 
  
(2.33) (-2.45) (-1.91) (1.96) (2.34) (-2.45) (-1.91) (1.98) 
SALEGS_GROWTH ϒ9 -0.006* -0.051*** 0.095*** 0.119*** -0.005 -0.053*** 0.095*** 0.123*** 
  
(-1.75) (-9.26) (16.54) (12.84) (-1.50) (-9.48) (16.58) (13.11) 
NOA ϒ10 -0.001 0.001 -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.001 0.001 -0.007*** -0.006*** 
  
(-0.89) (0.42) (-6.34) (-2.87) (-0.88) (0.42) (-6.37) (-2.88) 
LOSS ϒ11 -0.040*** 0.052*** -0.004 -0.096*** -0.039*** 0.051*** -0.003 -0.093*** 
  
(-7.62) (6.65) (-0.57) (-8.99) (-7.50) (6.44) (-0.50) (-8.67) 
INV_MILLS ϒ12 0.005** -0.031*** 0.050*** 0.078*** 0.004** -0.031*** 0.050*** 0.077*** 
  
(2.17) (-8.79) (12.41) (11.51) (2.06) (-8.66) (12.4) (11.38) 
Statistical Test: 
             F-test: ϒ2 = ϒ3 
 
1.93 0.15 0.27 0.01 
        F-test: ϒ4 = ϒ5 
     
8.44*** 5.04** 0.48 6.27** 
Adj. R2 
 
9.90% 6.40% 7.00% 6.60% 9.70% 6.20% 7.00% 6.50% 
N 
 
42,548 45,250 36,448 45,222 42,548 45,250 36,448 45,222 
I run equation (7) and (8) separately for meeting zero earnings benchmark and for meeting zero earnings growth benchmark samples. BEAT_ZERO_PRIVATE is one if a firm meets the 
zero earnings benchmark and is a private firms, and zero otherwise. BEAT_ZERO_PUBLIC is one if a firm meets the zero earnings benchmark and is a public equity firms, and zero 
otherwise.  BEAT_LAST_PRIVATE is one if a firm meets the zero earnings growth benchmark and is a private firms, and zero otherwise.  BEAT_LAST_PRIVATE is one if a firm meets 
the zero earnings growth benchmark and is a public equity firms, and zero otherwise. All other variable definitions are in Appendix A. *, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, 
respectively. The t-values are computed using robust standard errors for firm clusters. 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional Regressions of Abnormal Real Earnings Management Measures for Zero Earnings and Zero Earnings Growth Benchmark : Propensity Score 
Matched-Pairs 
  
BEAT_ZERO BEAT_LAST 
Variable 
 
Abnormal 
CFO 
Abnormal 
PROD 
Abnormal 
DISEXP 
Abnormal 
ALL 
Abnormal 
CFO 
Abnormal 
PROD 
Abnormal 
DISEXP 
Abnormal 
ALL 
Intercept ϒ0 0.019*** 0.049*** -0.012 -0.031 0.020*** 0.049*** -0.013 -0.03 
  
3.08 3.39 -0.45 -1.12 3.1 3.34 -0.48 -1.08 
PRIVATE ϒ1  -0.003* 0.009** -0.027*** -0.021** -0.004** 0.012** -0.027*** -0.026*** 
  
-1.93 2.01 -2.89 -2.46 -2.2 2.28 -2.9 -2.63 
BEAT_ZERO_PRIVATE ϒ2 -0.008 0.039*** -0.037** -0.085***     
  
-1.18 2.93 -2.39 -3.48 
    
BEAT_ZERO_PUBLIC ϒ3 -0.023*** 0.036*** -0.026 -0.074***     
  
-4.03 3.26 -1.62 -3.71 
    
BEAT_LAST_PRIVATE ϒ4     
0.002 -0.005 -0.019 0.007 
      
1.43 -1.5 -1.49 0.97 
BEAT_LAST_PUBLIC ϒ5     
-0.004** 0.008** -0.012 -0.017** 
      
-2.4 2.17 -1.11 -2.45 
SIZE ϒ6 -0.003*** 0 0.003 0 -0.003*** 0 0.003 0 
  
-4.64 -0.29 0.95 -0.1 -4.64 -0.31 0.97 -0.07 
LEVERAGE ϒ7 -0.007 -0.072*** -0.026 0.023 -0.008 -0.071*** -0.027 0.019 
  
-1.12 -4.08 -1.13 0.66 -1.23 -3.99 -1.17 0.54 
ROA ϒ8 0.220*** -0.367*** -0.043 0.540*** 0.223*** -0.375*** -0.038 0.555*** 
  
5.66 -6.9 -0.76 5.37 5.74 -7.01 -0.67 5.51 
SALEGS_GROWTH ϒ9 -0.004 -0.026*** 0.106*** 0.070*** -0.004 -0.027*** 0.107*** 0.072*** 
  
-0.88 -3.78 7.76 5.13 -0.8 -3.89 7.83 5.25 
NOA ϒ10 0.001 -0.004** -0.002 0.006* 0.001 -0.005** -0.002 0.006** 
  
1.42 -2.33 -1.06 1.92 1.46 -2.39 -0.99 2 
LOSS ϒ11 -0.018*** 0.019*** -0.008 -0.049*** -0.018*** 0.016** -0.006 -0.044*** 
  
-4.28 2.74 -0.86 -3.75 -4.14 2.44 -0.65 -3.44 
Statistical Test: 
         
    F-test: ϒ2 = ϒ3  
2.77* 0.04 0.29 0.15 
    
    F-test: ϒ4 = ϒ5      
7.21*** 5.80** 0.16 4.92** 
Adj. R2 
 
16.10% 8.70% 3.30% 8.20% 15.90% 8.50% 3.20% 7.90% 
N 
 
8,626   8,968  4,107  8,966  8,626  8,968  4,107  8,966  
I run equation (7) and (89) separately for meeting zero earnings benchmark and for meeting zero earnings growth benchmark samples. BEAT_ZERO_PRIVATE is one if a firm meets the 
zero earnings benchmark and is a private firms, and zero otherwise. BEAT_ZERO_PUBLIC is one if a firm meets the zero earnings benchmark and is a public equity firms and zero 
otherwise.  BEAT_LAST_PRIVATE is one if a firm meets the zero earnings growth benchmark and is a private firms, and zero otherwise.  BEAT_LAST_PRIVATE is one if a firm meets 
the zero earnings growth benchmark and is a public equity firms, and zero otherwise.  match each of the private equity firm-years with a firm-year in the public equity firm samples that are 
(1) in the same year, (2) in the same industry (2-digit SIC code), (3) have firm size and leverage within   25%, and (4) have the smallest propensity score difference. These procedures 
result in 4,484 pairs of the matched-firm years. The number of matched pairs used for each of four real earnings management measure varies All other variable definitions are in Appendix 
A. *, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. The t-values are computed using robust standard errors for firm clusters. 
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Table 7 reports whether private versus public equity firms differ in managing sales, production and other 
discretionary expenses to meet two different earnings benchmarks. I find that both private and public equity firms do 
not differ in manipulating operations to satisfy the zero earnings benchmark, but the private equity firms are 
significantly less likelyto manipulate their operations to beat the zero earnings growth benchmark than are their 
public equity counterparts. This is evident from the OLS regression outcome presented in Table 7. The coefficients 
of both MEET_ZERO_PRIVATE (ϒ2) and MEET_ZERO_PUBLIC (ϒ3) are statistically insignificant. The 
coefficient of BEAT_LAST_PRIVATE (ϒ4) is insignificant while the coefficients on BEAT_LAST_PUBLIC (ϒ5) 
are significant at the 1% level for all four real earnings management models. Significant ϒ2 and ϒ3 for zero earnings 
benchmark group indicate that both private equity and public equity firms alter operations to deliver a positive 
income. A finding of ϒ5 < ϒ4 (ϒ5 > ϒ4 for Abnormal PROD) indicates that public equity firms engage in more real 
earnings management to show earnings growth than do private equity firms. I use an F-test to determine whether 
statistically significant differences between private equity and public equity firms exist to meet earnings growth 
benchmark as compared to zero earnings benchmark. Significant F-test for zero earnings growth benchmark sample 
shows a difference between private equity and public equity firms in their likelihood of using real earnings 
management to show earnings growth. The above findings suggest that both private equity and public equity firms 
alter operations to meet the zero earnings benchmark, but the public equity firms are more likely to manage real 
activities to meet the zero earnings growth benchmark than their private counterparts.  
 
Panel B of Table 7 is the result of the regression (7) and the regression (8) for the matched-pairs based on 
the closest propensity score which is the estimated probability of a logit model. Overall, the regression outcome is 
qualitatively similar to the findings using the full sample. The first four columns provide empirical evidence for 
meeting zero earnings benchmark. Except Abnormal CFO, the coefficient of BEAT_ZERO_PRIVATE (ϒ2) is 
significant for Abnormal PROD, Abnormal DISEXP, and Abnormal ALL. For public equity firms, the coefficient is 
significant except for Abnormal DISEXP. Column 5 to column 8 provides the evidence of real earnings 
management for meeting zero earnings growth benchmark. Here, the evidence shows that only public equity firms 
manage operating activities to report improved earnings figure relative to the prior year. This reconfirms that both 
private and public equity firms manage real operating activities to meet the zero earnings benchmark, but the private 
firms are less likely to manage real operating activities to meet the earnings growth benchmark than do the public 
equity firms. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this study, I examine the effect of capital market pressure, as proxied by firm ownership structure, on the 
tendency to use real earnings management to meet earnings targets. Exposure to capital market pressure can be a 
monitoring factor that demands higher and more transparent earnings reports. However, capital market presence can 
burden top managers to make suboptimal operational decisions in order to avoid earnings disappointments, which 
may cause negative equity market reactions. The managers of firms with publicly traded equity bear higher costs of 
missing earnings thresholds since their compensation is at stake and they fear losing the confidence of equity 
investors who are sensitive to stock price movements. Using several measures of real earnings management, I find 
statistically significant empirical evidence that public equity firms have a higher propensity than private firms to 
manipulate their operations to meet earnings benchmark.  
 
Although private equity firms with public debt do not face the same capital market pressure that public 
equity firms face, they are not immune from incentives to engage in real earnings management. Specifically, I find 
that private equity firms with public debt engage in a greater degree of real earnings management as their debt 
moves closer to default. Given that debt claims become more like equity claims as a firm’s debt moves closer to 
default, this finding suggests that public debtholders exert similar pressure to public equity holders when their 
claims become more equity-like. Moreover, private equity firms with public debt that do engage in real earnings 
management appear to emphasize the zero earnings benchmark, consistent with prior research suggesting that this 
benchmark is of primary importance to creditors. 
 
 My study has some limitations. The sample size for the private equity firms (with public debt firms) is 
relatively small compared with the other groups of firms. Also, I cannot directly observe firms’ myopic behavior to 
manage operating activities to beat the earnings targets. The classification scheme I use for identifying earnings 
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managers based on the proximity of reported earnings to relevant benchmarks is imperfect and may include those 
firms that have reasons to deviate from normal operations other than earnings management. The real earnings 
management proxies I use may be subject to measurement errors. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable  Definition 
PRIVATE Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm has public debt (private equity) and, 0 otherwise 
SUSPECT Indicator variable equal to 1 if (1) net income divided by total assets is greater than 0 but less than 
or equal to 0.005, or (2) the change in net income divided by total assets relative to the prior year 
is greater than 0 but less than or equal to 0.005, 0 otherwise  
BEAT_ZERO Indicator variable equal to 1 if net income divided by total assets is greater than 0 but less than or 
equal to 0.005, 0 otherwise 
BEAT_LAST Indicator variable equal to 1 if the change in net income divided by total assets relative to their 
prior year is greater than 0 but less than or equal to 0.005, 0 otherwise 
CFO Cash flows from operations divided by lagged total assets 
PROD Production costs, calculated as the sum of cost of goods sold and change in inventory divided by 
lagged total assets 
DISEXP Discretionary expense, calculated as the sum of selling, general and administration expenses, 
advertising expenses and R&D expense divided by lagged total assets 
Abnormal CFO Measured as deviations from the predicted values from the CFO model  
Abnormal PROD Measured as deviations from the predicted values from the PROD model  
Abnormal DISEXP Measured as deviations from the predicted values from the DISEXP model  
NOA Net operating assets which is net operating assets computed as shareholders’ equity less cash and 
marketable securities, plus total debt scaled by sales  
SIZE Logarithm of total assets 
LEVERAGE Book value of total short- and long-term debt divided by total assets 
SALES_GROWTH Growth in sales from year t–1 to year t. 
ROA Return on assets, calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets 
NOL Indicator variable equal to one if a firm has net operating loss carryforwards available at the 
beginning of year t, and zero otherwise 
OPERATING_CYCLE Days for receivable collection period plus inventory turnover, calculated as average accounts 
receivables divided total revenues divided 360 days plus average inventory divided COGS 
divided by 360 days. 
LOSS Indicator variable, equal to 1 if income before extraordinary items is less than 0 and, 0 otherwise 
RNOA A profitability measure that is computed as operating income divided by net operating assets, 
where operating income is net income + translation adjustment + after-tax interest expense - 
after-tax interest income + minority interest income. Net operating assets are common equity + 
current debt + long-term debt + preferred stock- cash-investment and advances + minority interest 
(see Givoly et al. 2010) 
FIRM_AGE Number of years the firm is listed on Compustat Database 
BIG5 An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 5 accounting firm, and 0 otherwise 
QUICK Cash and cash equivalents plus total receivables divided by current liabilities 
CASH_ASSETS Ratio of cash and cash equivalents to lagged total assets. 
CAPX_ASSETS Ratio of capital expenditures to total assets 
DEFAULT Indicator variable, equal to 1 if S&P debt rating is an speculative grade (BBB- or below), 0 
otherwise.  
INV_MILLS Following the Heckman (1979) procedure, in the first stage I estimate a PROBIT model with firm 
size, sales growth, leverage, profitability (operating income divided by net operating assets), net 
operating loss carryforwards, quick ratio, operating cycle, firm age, capital expenditures (divided 
by total assets), a dummy for loss firms, and audit quality (big5 dummy). Estimates of the 
PROBIT model are used to compute an Inverse Mills’ Ratio for each firm. In the second stage, 
the Inverse Mills’ Ratio is added as a control variable. (See Katz 2009; Givoly et al. 2010) 
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NOTES 
